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In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for
profit-enhancing product advancements. The firms generate income by matching exogenously defined
demand preferences with an appropriately composed product portfolio of their own. Demand
preferences are initially unknown and first need to be revealed by an investigation of the possible
product variations. The better firms approximate demand preferences, the higher their profits. In the
ensuing innovation race, firms interact through information  spillovers resulting from the imperfect
appropriability of research successes. In the random period of the experiment, the continuity of the
search process is disturbed by an exogenous shock that affects both the supply and demand side and
again spurs research competition. Firms may henceforth explore an enlarged product space in
attempting to match the equally modified demand preferences. In our analysis, we explore the
behavioural regularities of agents who are engaged in innovation activities. As a key element we test
to what extend relative economic performance exercises a stimulating effect on the implementation of
innovation and imitation strategies.
Keywords: Innovation, Imitation, Patent Tournament, Trial and Error Process
[JEL] D81, O31
1. Introduction
In a world of perfect information, economic innovation is exclusively achieved on the basis of
optimal investment calculations of all market participants. Assuming that the success rate of
a given research activity is stochastically predictable the complexity of a firm’s decision to
invest in R&D is reduced to decision-making under risk, with the objective of profit
maximization (Friedman, 1953). Consequently, primarily those firms should invest that have
the strongest economic incentive to innovate (Harris & Vickers, 1987, Katz & Sapiro, 1987).
Yet the assumption of perfect information is a strong one, which does not adequately depict
reality. In the majority of cases, the prediction of the entire set of outcomes and the economic
success of R&D activities is impossible. Rather, economic markets are  characterized by
dynamic changes and uncertainty (Winter, 1964). Therefore, it seems important to us to
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analyze the strategic interaction – in terms of R&D activities – of firms that compete on
markets with changing consumer preferences. There exists a large body of empirical
literature on the influence of economic parameters on innovative success (e.g., Cohen &
Klepper, 1996). In particular, the empirical analysis of Acs & Audretsch (1988) showed that
market concentration has a negative influence on the total number of innovations. To the
contrary, aggregate R&D expenditures in a market are positively correlated with innovative
output, though the relationship need not be of a linear type. Nevertheless, the question, how
market concentration influences R&D expenditures cannot be convincingly answered.
Empirical studies of this particular question are rare, and do not expose certain market
structures that particularly promote innovative activities (e.g., Lerner, 1997). One could argue
that incumbent firms invest larger funds in the pursuit of innovations while they strive to
maintain their superior economic position in the market ( Dasgupta &  Stiglitz, 1980).
Alternatively, one may equally claim that new market entrants have stronger incentives than
their larger competitors to build up a competitive edge on the basis of successful innovations
(Reinganum, 1983). By means of this experimental study, we aim at exploring this relation in
detail. We believe that this issue has to be discussed in a broader perspective. Innovations
are heterogeneous with respect to their strategic implications on a particular market. In one
case, innovations may simply complement already established technologies, whereas, in
another case, innovations may render existing technologies obsolete. Introducing both types
of innovation in an experimental setting allows us to investigate the relation between firm size
and R&D activities.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical aspects of
competition and innovation in greater detail and highlights their coherence. In section 3, we
describe the market model – in which competition is exclusively a matter of product
improvements – and formulate our expectations concerning the strategically motivated timing
of product innovations. In section 4, the experimental design and results are introduced.
Section 5 summarizes the main findings.
2. Competition and Innovation
The traditional economic view on innovations relies on the existence of temporary
asymmetric information that provides firms with an opportunity to establish monopolies. The
latter may only be sustained for a prolonged period of time if property rights can be credibly
enforced by the legal system or if competitors are able to perfectly absorb the economic
benefits of their own research. This may occur if the firm disposes of large amounts of tacit
knowledge which prevents diffusion. In such a setting, competing firms are prevented from
incorporating external knowledge through spillovers and imitation. Models of technological
competition typically rely on the above-mentioned award structure (Tirole, 1989). Thus, they
ignore the fact that knowledge spillovers – via imitation or licensing of improvements – play a
central role in the diffusion of innovations, as they have a profound impact on aggregate
economic growth (Reinganum, 1982, Katz & Shapiro, 1987).4
Imitation may be considered a viable strategy in industries in which R&D investments
tend to be highly capital-intensive and risky. There is a large body of literature on patent
races, discussing the tension between innovation and imitation. Yet those studies either rely
on agents that are perfectly aware of the profitability of their activities (e.g., Vickers, 1986,
Beath, Katsoulacos &  Ulph, 1990), or they presume perfect patent protection so that the
winner of the race appropriates all benefits (e.g., Isaac & Reynolds, 1988, 1992, Zizzo 2002).
In this article, we want to relax both preconditions. In particular, we experimentally
analyze patent races in an environment of incomplete information about the economic
consequences of innovative activities. In this respect, we are especially interested in
observing behavioural regularities of agents making investment decisions, while they are at
the same time unable to deduce the optimal innovation strategy. Moreover, imitation may
equally prove to be a viable strategy in this setting, since we assume the duration of the
patent protection to be finite. In our  theorizing, we can build up on an earlier series of
experiments, in which we showed that an environment of intense competition – which is
identified by a relatively small distance in the capital wealth of competitors – significantly
stimulates risky R&D investments (Cantner et al, 2004).
However, in the earlier study, we applied a rather general notion of innovation. In
principle, innovations can be categorized according to their strategic implication and their
economic impact on a given market. In the following, we will distinguish between two types of
innovations, namely incremental and fundamental innovations. Incremental innovations
primarily add to an existing technology in the sense of enhanced product functionality and
style. Yet the overall production process in terms of applied technologies is typically only
marginally rearranged. In contrast, fundamental innovations are characterized by a profound
reorganization of a product’s entire value chain. Commonly, the actuated reorganization
leads to the introduction of new and more efficient technologies. This replacement effect
invariably renders a set of previously existing technologies and income sources obsolete
(Katz & Shapiro, 1987). Therefore, fundamental innovations are burdened with considerable
opportunity costs. On this basis, we claim that market participants do not share a uniform
economic incentive to strive for incremental and fundamental product improvements.
More generally, one may ask whether firm size is an important determinant in
promoting investments for both types of innovations. The economic literature offers two
principal ideas in this respect (Nelson & Winter, 1982,  Schumpeter, 1942). In one case
incremental innovations are mainly promoted by larger firms in an industry. These firms
feature a large capitalization and a persistently dominant market share over a prolonged
period of time. Over the years these firms are able to accumulate substantial amounts of
capital. This enables them to allocate large funds to risky and capital-intensive research
projects with the objective of protecting their economically superior market position.
However, fundamental innovations that replace existing technologies impose the burden of
high opportunity costs on well-established firms. In the other case, small firms are said to
excel in economic competition due to their increased flexibility and lower opportunity costs.
Although they face a more severe budget constraint than their larger counterparts, they may
take over the leading market position by means of risky, but eventually successful5
fundamental innovations. At the same time, the incumbent may be restrained by
organizational rigidity and technological lock-in effects. Of course, one can also think of the
opposite approach. Only incumbent firms with large financial resources are able to afford the
cost of developing fundamental innovations.
To analyze this question in detail, we will introduce both types of innovations in our
experiment. We consider a simple duopoly market in which two firms compete exclusively in
terms of risky product improvements. In case of success, a research project undertaken by
the firm yields a marketable innovation that enjoys temporary patent-protection. In a first
phase, subjects will be able to perform solely those innovations which are incremental in
nature, since the invalidating effect of succeeding technologies on preceding technologies is
intentionally omitted. In the ensuing second phase of the experiment, subjects will then be
able to generate fundamental innovations with a depreciating effect on preceding
technologies, as well.
3. Sequential searches for product improvements
We consider a simple duopoly market. Initially, two firms enter the market as symmetric
competitors. Both firms receive an identical capital endowment and do not yet possess a
portfolio of marketable products. In the first phase of the experiment, firms are free to design
their own product portfolio and to modify that portfolio subsequently. The firm generates
profits if it successfully specifies a product in such a way that the product coincides with an
exogenously defined demand preference, whereby the ideal specification is not known to the
firm beforehand. In all other instances, the firm is not able to derive any profit from the vainly
offered product. Given this incentive structure, firms have a strong motivation to carry out
search investments in order to establish a product portfolio that increasingly matches the
demand preferences.
At a point of time which is not specified to the subjects, the first phase of the
experiment is terminated by an exogenous shock. Essentially, the exogenous shock can be
equated with an external effect that expends the action set of suppliers and modifies the
demand characteristics of buyers. Consequently, firms face a wider range of strategic
options in the second phase of the experiment. As in the first phase, firms are free to make
the generic choice if they want to actively offer a set of products or if they want to remain
passive. In contrast to the preceding phase, they may henceforth also attempt to differentiate
themselves from the competitor by further refining their product portfolio. The incentive to
invest is maintained because successfully refined products yield higher revenues than
standard products.
At the start of the second phase of the experiment, firms will most likely have
experienced differing histories of research successes and economic outcomes. Thus, the
game model is suitable for allowing the market structure to evolve endogenously. The
strategic interaction among competitors in the first phase typically brings about heterogeneity
in the size of the two firms, whereby the latter figure is expressed in terms of the firm’s6
accumulated profits. The above-mentioned differences mainly result from diverging
competitive efforts and the unequal innovative success of firms.
3.1 First generation product improvements
In this section, we observe the first stage of a patent race in a duopoly market similar to the
preceding study (Cantner et al, 2004). Our motivation for incorporating this phase is to let the
two initially identical firms differentiate into one large and one small firm (both in terms of
their accumulated capital).
1 Of course, one may argue that asymmetry in firm size could also
be introduced by simply assigning varying initial endowments. However, we prefer the
chosen approach, because we assume that an exogenously imposed market structure is less
suitable than an endogenously grown structure for stimulating innovative activities. Let us
assume that each firm manages a portfolio that is comprised of n independent products.
2 In
order to exclusively concentrate on product innovations, consider the absence of any kind of
price competition. The economic success of a firm is solely determined by the accordance of
her products’ characteristics to specified demand preferences. Unlike price competition,
product attractiveness in our model is not determined on a cardinal scale. Thus, the
employed notion of quality competition does not correspond to reverse price competition in
the sense of “the-more-the-better”. Rather, quality competition in this setting should be
interpreted as a dichotomic variable.
For each of the  i = 1,...,n products in the firm’s portfolio, there exist  mi possible
specifications, which all represent feasible variations of the same product. Thus, for each
product i = 1,...,n, one has an unordered set
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of mi alternative specifications. We randomly designate one specification for each product as
the consumers’ ideal specification a
*0
i. The two firms, X and Y, are free to select a certain
variation of each product  x1,...,xn, respectively  y1,...,yn. Whenever a selected variation
matches the corresponding ideal specification by the choice  xi =   a
*0
i , or  yi = a
*0
i,  X,
respectively Y, sells one unit of the product in that period. Therefore, a firm may at most
realize a sales volume of n, if it is able to sell its entire product portfolio. More specifically,
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for z ˛ {x, y}.
Furthermore, several general provisions apply. The interaction between the two firms
always lasts for T periods with t = 1,...,T (T ‡ 1). Any technological change initiated by a firm
– in the sense of a firm selecting a new specification for product i – is associated with a fixed
one-time expenditure, known as switching costs g 
j
i.
                                                
1 As accumulated capital we define the sum of accumulated profits and the endowment.
2 Imagine, for example, two software manufacturers offering different software packages.7
Assuming negligible production costs, the two firms, X and Y, realize (undiscounted)
profits of p
t
z for z ˛ {x, y} in periods prior to the occurrence of the exogenous shock in period
t’. For all periods t with t < t’ £ T, the following profit function applies:
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Hence, the incurred switching costs equal one sales unit and are deducted each time one of
the n different product aspects is changed to another product variation that has not
previously been selected. We assume that each product that is supplied by a firm can be
perfectly observed by the firm’s competitor. It is hereby insignificant whether that product
coincides with demand preferences or not. Additionally, we presume that both firms are
informed about their own and the competitor’s product choices and economic success.
Consequently, each firm may rapidly imitate a successful product variation of the competitor
at the marginal cost of one sales unit. Imperatively, in such an environment of high spillovers,
the incentive to engage in costly research with the aim of achieving product improvements
must be weak. Therefore, we introduce property rights in the form of a patent protection in
order to promote risky investments. If firm X is the first to discover the optimal i-th product a
*0
i
by xi = a
*0
i in period h, then the firm’s competitor cannot choose yi = a
*0
i in periods t = h + 1 to
t = h + k with k ‡ 1. Similarly, if the firm’s competitor is the first to find a
*0
i by yi = a
*0
i, then firm
X cannot choose a
*0
i for k periods thereafter. If both firms independently identify a
*0
i at the
same time, both can freely choose a
*0
i afterwards.
Undoubtedly, in this experimental setting, we do not observe innovative behaviour in
terms of individual creativity or problem solving. Instead, we arbitrarily define demand
preferences and investigate which heuristics subjects commonly apply to reveal these
preferences and by which factors their actions are stimulated. The focus of this study is on
the strategic interaction of rivalling decision-makers, who may pursue product innovations to
improve their relative position. In this respect, it is important to recall that successful product
improvements in the first phase of the experiment have the character of incremental
innovations, insofar as they improve the preceding product without depreciating any pre-
existing technology.
3.2 Second generation product improvements
In a randomly selected period (denoted as period t’), an exogenous shock takes place and
modifies several parameters which affect both the suppliers’ action set and the buyers
demand preferences. Subjects may henceforth conduct additional costly research in order to
refine their product portfolio. In the context of the model, “product refinement” translates into
the attempt of a firm to bring her portfolio into conformity with a set of previously identified
demand preferences.8
The existence of an improved product coincides with a refinement in demand
preferences. Both effects are intended to intensify research competition once again. This
time, however, the market structure has significantly changed, since firms henceforth feature
asymmetric capital endowments. As previously stated, we favour the setting in which firm
heterogeneity evolves endogenously as the result of the subjects’ interaction as opposed to a
setting in which an asymmetric market structure is imposed by means of varying the firms’
initial endowment.
The exogenous shock that takes place in the randomly determined period t’ increases
the set of possible specifications of each product by mi × pi additional items. Therefore, from
period t’ onwards, each product i = 1,…,n features an unordered set
{ } 2
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of mi × (pi  + 1) alternative specifications.
The calculation of the attained sales volume in the second experiment phase is
similar to the revenue function that applies in the periods preceding period t’. Whenever a
product specification of firm X (Y) coincides with the ideal first generation specification by the
choice  xi = a
*0
i ( yi = a
*0
i),  X ( Y) sells one unit of the product in that period. Once the
exogenous shock has occurred, X (Y) is able to sell two units of a product in that period
whenever the specification of that product conforms to the newly discovered ideal second
generation specification by the choice xi = a
**
i (yi = a
**
i). The switching costs g
j
i amount to one
sales unit, remain constant during the entire experiment, and are charged whenever a new
product specification is selected. However, the opportunity costs a subject incurs while
modifying a product specification may exceed the sheer switching costs. This situation arises
if the subject already generates revenues from the properly selected first generation product.
Due to the fact that potential product improvements are investigated in a sequential
order, subjects are able to reduce the magnitude of the searchable product space by
continuously eliminating invalid branches of the search tree. Note that the ideal second
generation specification is directly linked to the specification of the preceding ideal first
generation improvement. Thus, firms ought to adopt the search heuristics of identifying the
ideal first generation specification of the product in the first place, and they should only then
move on to find out the ideal second generation specification. Any attempt to search for the
ideal second generation specification in some part of the search tree other than the branch of
the ideal first generation product will inevitably come to nothing.
Thus, one can define the proximity of any xi, respectively yi, to a
**
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for z ˛ {x,y}. Consequently, the maximal total market size increases to 2n for each firm for all
periods t ‡ t’. We can define the profit p
t
z for z ˛ {x,y} of firm X and Y, respectively, in a period
t £ T as follows9
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Similar to the granting of patents for first generation improvements, here a patent is
also awarded to the firm that first reveals the ideal second generation improvement. Note
that patents on first generation improvements are not affected by the exogenous shock and
remain valid until they expire after a predefined length of time. However, any patent on a first
generation improvement is overridden as soon as the corresponding second generation
improvement has been identified.
3.3 Hypotheses
Due to the complexity in predicting all possible outcomes of this game, which would require
enormous Bayesian reasoning on one’s own and the competitor’s investments, we assume
that individual decisions are not based on optimal investment calculus. Therefore, we will not
provide optimal innovation strategies for this environment. We expect that investments,
nonetheless, follow certain regularities. Since economic interactions take place in a complex
setting, which ultimately approximates decision-making under uncertainty, we maintain that
subjects will search for reference points that assist them in making sensible investment
decisions. We claim that firms evaluate the success of risky R&D investments not exclusively
in terms of absolute profits, but also in comparison with the performance of their competitors.
Consequently, we assume that subjects do perceive the modelled competition for innovation
leadership as a tournament. Therefore, we suggest that the concept of the relative
performance of firms is suitable for providing such a reference point.
3 If one firm is able to
establish temporal monopolies for certain products, then the intensity of the competitive
threat to the remaining market participants will increase significantly.
The latter will find their own relative strength diminishing, which is evidenced by a
decline in their sales volume and profitability. Therefore, in contradiction to the ideas
presented in the earlier literature on innovation, it is not the absolute size of firms that
promotes the intensity of research activities, in the sense of a positive correlation between
firm size and aggregate research investments. Rather, research propensity is determined by
the relative positioning of firms with respect to their size, and it reaches its maximum when
competing firms are of identical size.
In line with this reasoning, Schotter & Weigelt (1992) observe in earlier tournament
experiments, in which competitors are endowed with unequal cost structures that
disadvantaged players discontinue their effort investment and drop out of competition during
                                                
3 In contrast to absolute income motivation for workers, Stark (1990) introduces the concept of relative
deprivation in the discussion of labour tournaments. In this context, workers feel relatively deprived if
their own individual income is lower than the average income of a reference group. Consequently,10
later periods of the experiment. Thus, we assume for the first phase of product improvements
that a small distance compared to the competitors’ accumulated profits promotes risky
investments. Conversely, a larger relative distance in terms of the accumulated profits of the
two firms decreases the rate of investment. In accordance with earlier findings (Cantner et
al., 2004), we will analyze investments with respect to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In the first phase, those subjects who resemble each other In terms
of their accumulated capital exhibit a higher probability of investing in risky
incremental innovations than those who are either far ahead or far behind their
competitor in terms of their accumulated capital.
Although second generation product improvements are more profitable than first
generation improvements, the opportunity costs for investigating a new alternative do
increase. In the setting of this experiment, this can be equated with the existence of an
outside option that guarantees a positive rent. Thus, the opportunity cost in the second
phase of the experiment amounts to two sales units if the specification of the preceding first
generation product is known to the firm.
4 Note in this respect that second generation product
improvements have the character of fundamental product improvements, since they replace
first generation product specifications. Consequently, due to the increased costs of search, it
seems reasonable to test for the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.1: The mean of the aggregated research investments of all subjects
in first generation improvements will be higher than the corresponding mean of
research investments in second generation improvements.
Yet the question arises whether all firms are identically affected by the increased
opportunity costs. There are good reasons for both groups leading or lagging firms, to pursue
research in second level improvements. Of course, one could assume that economically
leading firms expedite investments in second generation product improvements since they
face a less severe budget constraint. According to this rationale, leading firms which can
afford R&D expenditures invest in research with a higher intensity than their counterparts.
Note that this claim corresponds to the empirical finding that R&D expenditures positively
influence the number of innovations (Acs &  Audretsch, 1988). Therefore, we will  analyze
Investments for second generation improvements in hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.2: (Economically) Leading firms at the time of the exogenous shock
will consecutively invest more than the corresponding (economically) lagging
competitors.
On the other hand, the earlier literature favours the idea that lagging firms in particular
promote fundamental innovation (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Firms face the problem that
fundamental innovations replace existing technologies, and as such existing sources of
income. In particular, leading firms would be asked after the exogenous shock to surrender
                                                                                                                                                        
workers invest an additional effort in order to minimize the income difference between themselves and
the reference group.
4 An opportunity cost of one sales unit is incurred due to active searching in contrast to abstaining from
search. Moreover, declining a risk-free rent adds another sales unit to opportunity costs.11
those product improvements that laid the foundation for their superior economic position. In
contrast, fundamental innovations give lagging firms the opportunity to surpass the
competitor and, if still existing, to devalue the competitor’s first generation patent while
imposing a new patent on the market herself. Again, we would like to point out that this claim
is consistent with the empirical result that market concentration negatively affects the number
of innovations (Acs & Audretsch, 1988). For these reasons, we test for hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.3: (Economically) Lagging firms at the time of the exogenous shock
will consecutively invest more than the corresponding (economically) leading
competitors.
Finally, we want to ask whether the perception of opportunity costs is affected by the
competitive threat. This context seems particularly relevant for firms that are only slightly
ahead or behind their competitor in terms of relative capital. The decision to invest in
research is influenced by the idiosyncratic weighting of potential losses and gains. If the
focus is on potential losses, the following reasoning applies. If an effected research
investment fails, it will invariably deteriorate the initiating firm’s relative competitive position.
A firm that had thus far outperformed its competitor by a slim margin may actually lose its
leading position. Likewise, a lagging firm may further aggravate its competitive disadvantage
by deliberately forfeiting a risk-free rent in terms of sales that it could have appropriated
otherwise. If the focus is, however, on potential gains, then firms that are in a
disadvantageous economic position in comparison with their competitor – prior to the
exogenous shock – may consider the introduction of the second generation of product
specifications as a chance to improve their relative position and invest largely. Therefore, we
deduce that only those pairs of players that feature a clear-cut difference in their
accumulated capital do exhibit a substantial propensity to invest in research. Thus, the data
is analyzed in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.4: In the second phase, those subjects who resemble each other in
terms of their accumulated capital exhibit a lower probability of investing in risky
fundamental innovations than those who are either far ahead or far behind their
competitor in terms of their accumulated profits.
4. Experimental results
We tested our set of hypotheses in a series of experiments. Altogether, 60 subjects
participated in four sessions that were conducted in February and June of 2004.
5 Subjects
were mostly students with a major in economics and business administration who had
already completed two years of studies. At the beginning of a session, written instructions
were handed out to each participant. The same instructions were subsequently read out
aloud by the experimenter. In order to ensure that all participants had fully understood the
experimental rules, all of the subjects were required to take a quiz about the rules before
they were allowed to commence with the experiment. After each period, subjects were
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informed about their success in finding product specifications that coincided with demand
preferences (i.e., whether they gained a patent), their own period income, the competitor’s
choice of product specifications, and the competitor’s success in terms of patents and period
income. Subjects were provided with pen and paper so that they could take notes. The
majority of participants did take notes.
The entire experiment lasted for 15 periods and consisted of two phases which were
separated by the exogenous shock. In the course of the experiment, subjects were free to
modify their product portfolio in every single period. The portfolio always consisted of n = 8
independent products. Initially, all products were unspecified. Prior to the exogenous shock,
each subject was able to select one out of a set of distinct variations of the same (first
generation) product specifications mi, i = 1, . . . , 8, with mi = 6 for each of the eight products.
If a subject preferred to leave a certain product unspecified, she was free to do so, as well.
However, in this case, demand for this product invariably decreased to zero. At the beginning
of the experiment, it was pointed out to all subjects that the exogenous shock would occur at
a randomly determined point of time between period seven and ten (bounds included).
Subjects were free to maintain their current first generation product specification (yielding a
demand of 1 for this product) or to specify the products in greater detail (if successful,
yielding a demand of 2 for this product). For each of the eight (first generation) specifications,
subjects could choose one out of a set of distinct variations of the same (second generation)
product specifications pi, i = 1, . . . , 8, with pi = 6. As for convenience, the search space of
variations for second generation products was kept manageable by the automatic elimination
of evidently unsuccessful branches of the search tree. Thus, only those product variations
were available for selection which had not already been falsified through own or the
competitor’s previous search attempts. The remaining product variations that logically could
still contain the optimal variation for the second generation improvements were then listed for
each of the eight independent products. Therefore, in case the suitable variation of the first
generation product were found before the exogenous shock, subjects had the choice among
not specifying a product, selecting the suitable variation of the first generation, or engaging in
further research in second generation improvements. If that subject was the first to discover
the respective demand preference, she was awarded a patent, as well. The duration of
patent protection was arbitrarily set to six periods for the first level product and to three
periods for the second level product.
Subjects needed approximately 65 minutes – including the time spent for instruction
and solving the quiz – to complete the 15 periods of the experiment. They earned 9.81 Euros
on average, with payoffs ranging from 4.20 Euros to 13.70 Euros. Subjects received an initial
endowment of 30 ECU (experimental currency units). At the end of the experiment, both the
endowment and the proceeds from the experiment were summed up and converted at the
exchange rate of 1 ECU = 0.10  Euros. Theoretically it was possible for subjects to go
bankrupt in the experiment. This, however, never occurred. As all subjects were provided
with pen and paper to enable them to take notes, unwise investment decisions such as
unnecessary redundant research (i.e., selecting a product specification which had previously13
already been unsuccessfully explored by the competitor) occurred only rarely.
6  Another
investment inefficiency resulted from the fact that a set of subjects did not invest into
research projects in situations in which they reasonably should have invested. In these
cases, the decision to invest was not associated with any risk, since the product’s demand
preference had already been revealed by the competitor. All there was for the subjects to do
was to select that very specification.
7 At large, we can infer that the subjects’ individual
search behaviour was altogether quite systematic, since the large majority of all subjects
successfully exploited emerging profit opportunities and avoided costly research
inefficiencies.
4.1 First generation product improvements
First, we want to  analyze the subjects’ economic performance while competing for first
generation product improvements. Before the exogenous shock is introduced in period eight
or nine (depending on the session), 29 out of 30 groups have already found all eight first
generation product improvements. In all of these groups, one subject clearly outperforms the
other group member in terms of accumulated capital. The winner in the period preceding the
exogenous shock shall hereafter be denoted as the leader, the other subject as the follower.
Only for one group does the first phase of the experiment end in a draw.
8 The average
accumulated capital of leaders surpasses the accumulated capital of followers from period 3
onward. Figure 1 shows the development of average closing accounts (measured in ECU)
for leaders and followers.
--------------------------
Insert Figure 1 here
--------------------------
As one possible explication, one can argue that the gap between the accumulated
capital of leaders and followers can also result from diverging initial investments in product
improvements. However, there is not a significant difference between the magnitude of
investments of leaders and followers. Leaders invest 6.34 ECU while followers invest 5.97
ECU on average in period 1. In an earlier study, we presented another explanation (Cantner
et al, 2004). In a series of experiments on patent races in an uncertain environment, we
showed that subjects’ willingness to invest in product improvements is dependent on the
relative performance of competitors. We already introduced the idea that subjects who are in
a group with a smaller gap in account balances exhibit a higher probability of investing in
risky product innovations than subjects who are either far ahead or far behind in terms of
their accumulated capital (Hypothesis 1).
                                                
6 0.7% (4.3%) of all effected investments in the first (second) phase features this type of error.
7 In the worst-performing period, aggregated sales of all subjects could have been 8% (5%) greater if
all risk less profit opportunities had been exploited.
8 In this particular case, we denote the firm that outperforms the competitor in the second last period
as the leader, and the other firm as the follower.14
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we analyze the effected first generation investments in a
logit analysis of each individual investment decision.
9 In the fitted model, the dependent
variable assumes the value of 1 if the player carries out a risky investment for a potential first
generation product improvement and assumes 0 otherwise.
10 Of course, subjects face the
problem of scarce investment resources in the first phase of the experiment. A higher
number of investment opportunities lowers the investment probability for each individual one.
Hence, we introduce the variable NoOp, which accounts for the number of further reasonable
risky investment options ( NoOp  ˛ [0,7]), where we assume that  NoOp has a negative
influence on investments. Results are summarized in Table 1 as model OBJ.
























AIC 1434 1442 1434
Table 1: Logit models for risky first generation investments
In addition, we test for the influence of the absolute size of the accumulated capital
(ownAccount) in period t on the probability of carrying out a risky investment in period t.
Results are reported as model  ABS. We then define a measure for the relative capital
(denoted as relAccount) as the difference between one’s own accumulated capital and the
competitor’s accumulated capital in period t, divided by the sum of the two. With respect to
Hypothesis 1, we expect that subjects who feature a negative relative account balance at the
time of the investment decision will have a higher probability of conducting further search
investments for increasing relAccount. To the contrary, for those subjects who surpass their
competitor in terms of their relative capital at the time of the investment decision, we
presume a negative relation between the relative capital  relAccount and the probability to
invest in a product improvement.
11 We mark those subjects who had a positive relative
capital  relAccount with the dummy variable  dpos so that we can test for the interaction
                                                
9 A fixed-group effects-panel data estimation is applied.
10 We exclude all those by no means risky investments from the analysis in which the ideal
specification is already known (and so there is no reason to further explore the remaining search
space for this product) or in which only one alternative is still remaining (so that the investment is no
longer risky).
11 Note that relAccount is negative for subjects who dispose of less accumulated capital than their
competitor, while it is positive for subjects who dispose of more capital than their counterpart.15
relAccount × dpos. Results are reported as model REL. Estimated parameters of the fitted
logit models are reported in Table 1. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis, goodness
of fit is reported by the  Akaïke information criterion (AIC), and stars indicate levels of
significance.
12
The results of our estimation support the assumption that the variable NoOp has a
significant negative effect on the probability of investing. To the contrary, the variable
ownAccount does not significantly affect the investment propensity. Yet the interaction of
relAccount × dpos + relAccount shows a significant negative effect of the leader’s relative
capital on her probability to invest. Thus, the logit estimation confirms Hypothesis 1, insofar
as the greater the subject’s relative capital becomes, the lower is her probability of engaging
in risky investments. By contrast, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 1 for followers. Firms that
exhibit a negative relative capital significantly deviate from our prediction insofar as a
decreasing value of relAccount does not lower the follower’s probability to invest, whereas
we expected a positive correlation between these variables. One can explain this result by
the fact that, in contrast to earlier experiments on patent races (Cantner et al, 2004), subjects
anticipate that, subsequent to the end of the first phase, the patent race will continue for
second generation improvements. Thus, followers also persistently search for ideal first
generation improvements, knowing that those will be the prerequisites for further product
development in the second phase.
4.2 Second generation product improvements
In the second phase, subjects typically do not explore the entire set of product alternatives as
thoroughly as they did in the first phase of the experiment. Only 16 out of 30 groups are able
to identify all eight second generation product improvements. Apparently, this results from
lower investment intensity in the first three periods following the exogenous shock, as
compared to the corresponding periods in the first phase. Figure 2 compares the mean
investment levels for first and second generation product improvements.
--------------------------
Insert Figure 2 here
--------------------------
Indeed, a statistical comparison of the average investment levels of the first eight
periods and their corresponding counterparts after the exogenous shock shows that
investment levels in the first phase start out at higher levels, but decline more rapidly over
the course of that phase, as well. However, investment intensity in the second phase of the
experiment is more balanced (mean of 1.96 for each product, standard deviation of 1.96)
when compared with the first phase (mean of 2.18, standard deviation of 2.41).
13 The overall
intensity of search investments is not significantly lower, but it is less pronounced in the early
periods. Thus, we have to reject Hypothesis 2.1. Consequently, the increased opportunity
                                                
12 * significant on a 10% level; ** significant on a 5% level; *** significant on a 1% level.
13 The difference in means of investment levels for phase 1 and 2 is noticeable, but it is not significant
(p=0.101, t-test, two-sided). The difference in variance, though, is clearly significant (p < 0.001, F-test,
two-sided).16
costs do not lead to lower search activities per se, but they attenuate the time pressure under
which the subject has to make an investment decision. This could be the consequence of
increased opportunity costs, but could also reflect the greater profitability of successful
search attempts, which encourages investments even in the concluding periods of the
second phase.
Still, so far we have not yet identified the type of firm that preponderantly invests in
product improvements. Is it the leading firm that is backed by her strong economic position or
is it rather the lagging firm that has the ambition to improve her relative economic standing
after the exogenous shock? A comparison of the mean investment levels for the groups of
leaders and followers does not point out any significant difference.
14 As a consequence, we
cannot identify any regularity with regard to the investments of leaders and followers.
Therefore, we can neither confirm Hypothesis 2.2 that firms with superior market power in an
established market do promote innovations ( Schumpeter, 1942), nor can we affirm
Hypothesis 2.3 that less established firms actively attempt to exploit a competitive
opportunity (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Rather, we analyze the subjects’ propensity to invest in relation to their relative capital
at the time of the exogenous shock (Hypothesis 2.4). With this in mind, we form four groups
of subjects (a, b, c, and d). Group a includes all those subjects who exhibit relative capital
(relAccount, as defined in the previous section) of relAccount <  -0.15 at the time of the
exogenous shock. Subjects of group  b feature relative capital in the range of  -0.15 <
relAccount < 0, while group c comprises all subjects with relative capital in the range of 0 <
relAccount < 0.15. Finally, group d includes all the subjects with relative capital of relAccount
> 0.15. This partitioning is based on the following deliberation: The subjects of group  a
represent distant followers who are very unlikely to catch up. Their own accumulated capital
equals less than 75% of their competitor’s accumulated capital. The subjects of group b are
slightly more fortunate. Their accumulated capital is still lower than that of their competitors,
but they possess at least 75% of the latter’s accumulated capital. Similarly, the subjects of
group c feature higher accumulated capital than their competitor, but exceed the competitor’s
accumulated capital by at most 35%. Finally, group d comprises all the subjects who have
more than 35% more of their own accumulated capital than the other. Thus, one can state
that the relative position of each of the four groups
15 is quite different. An analysis of the
overall sum of investments in second generation product improvements – which is carried
out at the level of the previously defined groups – exhibits the structure that is shown in
Figure 3. Due to the fact that the exogenous shock occurs in different periods – which
depended on the session – we have to correct for the fact that, for some subjects, the
second experiment phase lasts for 9 periods, while, for others, it only lasts for 8 periods. We
fix the issue by truncating the data for the former group after the completion of period 14.
                                                
14 In each of the periods of the second phase, the corresponding test (t-test, two-sided) remains
insignificant.
15 Please note that both groups  a and  d (groups  b and  c) are composed of 14 firms (16 firms,
respectively).17
Thus, in terms of our analysis, all subjects face a second experiment phase of uniform
duration.
Indeed, the relative competitive position of a subject has a direct implication on her
investment behaviour, which confirms Hypothesis 2.4. A comparison of the average sum of
investments illustrates significantly greater investment intensity for group a (17.57 ECU) than
for group  b (12.40).
16 Investment levels for groups  b (12.40) and  c (15.56) vary
insignificantly.
17 In a comparison between group c (15.56) and d (17.20), the latter group
features a greater, albeit insignificant, mean investment.
18
--------------------------
Insert Figure 3 here
-------------------------
It seems that subjects who find themselves in a disadvantageous economic position
relative to their competitor (group a) prior to the exogenous shock consider the introduction
of the second generation of product specifications as a chance to improve their relative
position, and they thus invest largely. This result supports the claim that less established
firms are active promoters of innovations. To the contrary, subjects who fare somewhat
better in terms of their relative capital (group b), but who are nevertheless still economically
behind in a direct comparison with their competitor, perceive the introduction of the second
generation of product aspects rather as a threat than as an opportunity. As soon as attempts
for further product improvement entail positive opportunity costs, then subjects in bitter
competition with their competitor no longer promote innovations that depreciate former
investments and render existing products obsolete. In this situation, the majority of subjects
prefer to fully exploit the given profit opportunities first before moving on to conduct new and
risky search investments. The same is true for subjects who gain the leading position in the
market, but do so by only a slim margin (group c). They invest less than firms who dominate
their market – with respect to their far superior accumulated capital. Nonetheless, subjects in
group  d act rather irregularly, which is pointed out by the high variance of the group’s
investments levels. While some subjects seem to be highly motivated and eager to defend
their dominant economic position, others invest only moderately. Yet the mean of
investments roughly equals the mean investment of the economically worst performing
group.
19
For further interpretation, we estimate another logit model of each risky investment
into second generation improvements.
20 The dependent variable equals 1 if the risky
investment occurred, and 0 otherwise. In contrast to the first experiment phase, we must
state that the product space which subjects are facing after the exogenous shock is not
                                                
16 The mean of investments of group a is significantly greater than the mean of group b (p = 0.028, t-
test, one-sided).
17 The equality of means of investments for both groups cannot be rejected (p = 0.317, t-test, two-
sided).
18 It cannot be confirmed that mean investments of group d exceed those of group c (p = 0.324, t-test,
one-sided).
19 A t-test (two-sided) for the equality of means remains insignificant (p=0.906).
20 Again, a fixed-group effects-panel data estimation is applied.18
entirely homogeneous. For numerous groups, some patents on first generation products are
still in effect at the time of the exogenous shock. Evidently, a subject’s opportunity costs
amount to zero for those products that the competitor is holding a patent to. From a strategic
point of view, subjects shall favour investments in exactly these products, since a successful
second generation product improvement will not only increase one’s own turnover, but will
equally devalue the competitor’s monopoly. Therefore, we introduce the independent
variable comPat, which equals 1 if the competitor holds the patent on the first generation
product at the time of investment, and 0 otherwise. We expect comPat to have a positive
influence on investment. Table 2 summarizes the results as model OBJ.












































AIC 3259 3227 3261 3183
Table 2: Logit models for risky second generation investments
Again, we conduct an analysis of the influence of the absolute size of the
accumulated capital ( ownAccount) in period t on the probability of carrying out a risky
investment in period t (results are reported as model ABS). Next, we analyze the influence of
the relative account on the probability to invest. We already showed previously that the total
investment levels are different for the groups a, b, c, and d. Thus, we introduce the variable
relAccount and three dummy variables as dependent variables, which interact with the
variable relAccount (relAccount × db, relAccount × dc, and relAccount × dd). The latter three
variables show deviations with respect to the influence of the variable relAccount on the
propensity to invest for subjects that belonged to group b, c, and d.
21 Table 2 shows the
results of the estimation as model  REL. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis,
                                                
21 Recall that  relAccount is negative for subjects belonging to groups  a and  b, while positive for
subjects belonging to groups c and d.19
goodness of fit are reported by the  Akaïke information criterion (AIC), and stars indicate
levels of significance.
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The results of our estimation show the significant positive influence that the existence
of a competitor-held patent exercises on one’s own investment probability. As it turns out,
ownAccount has a significant influence on investment, as well. In contrast to the analysis of
first generation investments, we find a significant saturation effect in the second model, as
the coefficient of ownAccount is significantly negative. This result seems reasonable since all
subjects know for sure that the experiment will end after the second phase. Therefore, we
finally provide a model (reported as model  A&R) that incorporates  ownAccount and
relAccount as explanatory variables.
With respect to the variable relAccount, the results of the REL and the A&R model
indicate a significant difference between the investment behaviour of groups a, b, c, and d.
Within each group the results for groups a, b, and c support Hypothesis 2.4. Here, a smaller
relative distance with respect to relative capital increases the probability to invest in second
generation product improvements. However, the result is not true for group d (i.e., relAccount
× dd + relAccount > 0). Remember that those firms are already in the comfortable position
such that their relative capital exceeds that of the competitor by at least 35% in the period in
which the exogenous shock occurs. Therefore, from the leader’s perspective, the
competitor’s accumulated capital may no longer provide a valid reference point for guiding
investments into product improvements. As a result, subjects of group d seem to be only
marginally affected in their investment behaviour by their relative competitive position.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we experimentally investigated prominent investment patters of firms that
strategically interact in a duopoly market and compete for economically successful product
innovations. The experiment is modelled so as to allow for a scenario of sequential
innovations, in which both incremental as well as fundamental innovations may be pursued.
Our research aims at identifying possible economic factors that exhibit a direct impact on the
subjects’ decision to invest or to refrain from investing in costly research. To this effect, we
propose several  logit models that provide explicit and consistent results. We want to
emphasize three main findings. First, we observe a significant effect of the subject’s relative
economic position on her propensity to carry out search investments for incremental
innovations. If the competitive threat is high – which is indicated by a small difference in the
subjects’ accumulated capital – then subjects exhibit a significantly higher propensity to
invest. Second, we can show that, depending on their relative competitive position, subjects
also pursue distinct investment strategies for fundamental innovations. If the competitive
threat is low – which is indicated by a wide gap between the subjects’ accumulated capital –
then subjects exhibit a significantly higher propensity to invest in fundamental innovations
than in situations in which competitors posses equal capitalization and the competitive threat
is substantial. In the latter environment, the likelihood that the subjects will effect further
                                                
22 * significant on a 10% level; ** significant on a 5% level; *** significant on a 1% level.20
investments is significantly reduced. As the third finding, the impact of increased opportunity
costs on investments in innovations has to be differentiated. The direction of the effect
significantly depends on the relative positioning of competitors in terms of their capitalization.
Yet the experimental evidence provides little support for the hypotheses that either leading
firms or lagging firms primarily promote further innovative investments. Consequently, the
results of our experimental analysis confirm earlier empirical findings (e.g.  Lerner, 1997).
Throughout the experiment, investment levels of leading and lagging firms – if treated as a
group – do not differ significantly at any time. Rather, the difference in investment levels
between leaders and followers is motivated by the subject’s relative economic position with
respect to the direct competitor.
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Appendix: Instructions
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. From now on, we kindly ask you to
refrain from any public announcements and attempts to communicate directly with other
participants. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude you from this experiment. If you
do have any questions, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to your place
and answer your questions. In the experiment, you will repeatedly interact with one other
participant who has received the same instructions as you have.
In this experiment you are asked to manage a large technology company. In each
period, you have to decide whether you want to engage in research activities in eight
different research fields (e.g., in motor engines, cellular telephones, etc.). For each research
field, you and the other participant can choose from six alternative technologies (e.g., for the
cellular telephones wap-technology,  gps-technology, etc.), which we denote as ”tech 1.0”,
”tech 2.0”, etc. . For the entire duration of the experiment, we randomly set an ideal
technology in each of the eight research fields. Your task is to specify the technology fields
such that they meet those ideal technologies. Whenever you choose the ideal technology,
you receive one ECU (experimental currency unit). Whenever you do not choose the ideal
technology, you receive no ECU. In total, you receive in each period t the sum of all earnings
from all eight technology fields (we denote them as Dt). In the first period, for instance, you
can receive at most eight ECU – if you meet all eight ideal technologies. In the worst case,
you earn nothing – if you miss all eight technology fields. You can also leave one or more
fields unspecified. However, if you do so, you will definitely not receive any ECU in those
fields for the given period.
If for any technology field you are the first, say in period t, to find the ideal technology,
you obtain a patent for the next six periods in this technology field, and the other participant
is not allowed to choose the ideal technology in the meantime. Similarly, if the other is first in
finding the ideal technology, you cannot choose the ideal technology for the next six periods.22
After the patent has expired, both you and the other participant can choose the ideal
technology (which remains unchanged in the course of the experiment). If both of you find
the ideal technology in the same period, you can both choose the ideal technology
afterwards. It is important to note that you have to pay one ECU for trying a new technology.
This rule does not apply to the research of technologies that you had already tried in earlier
periods. Leaving fields unspecified does not incur any costs, either.
In total, this experiment lasts for 15 periods. In a random period t’, between period
seven and ten, the following happens: The remaining technologies in all technology fields
unfold into six sub-technologies; that is, if the ideal technology is already found prior to that
period, only this technology splits into sub-technologies. If you or the other participant had
already tried a technology unsuccessfully, this technology is not split into sub-technologies,
but disappears.
Example: You found the ideal technology “tech 2.0” in the field “cellular telephones”. Then,
only technology “tech 2.0” is divided into “tech 2.0”, “tech 2.1”, .., “tech 2.6”. If you and the
other only found that the ideal technology is either “tech 2.0” or “tech 3.0” (i.e., you both tried
all other alternatives unsuccessfully), the two technologies will have been divided into “tech
2.0”, “tech 2.1”, ..., “tech 3.0”, ..., “tech 3.6”.
Still, for the specification “tech .0”, you receive one ECU in period t’ and later if the
selected technology is ideal. If the patent for the ideal technology has not yet expired in t’, it
remains in effect for the sub-technology “tech .0” until the patent duration has elapsed
(however, this is not the case for the other sub-technologies “tech .1”, ..., “tech .6”). If one of
you is the first find the ideal technology “tech .0” even after period t’, this person obtains a
patent for the next six periods. Within the ideal technology (and only there), there exists an
ideal sub-technology. If you identify the ideal sub-technology, by choosing it, you receive two
ECU. If you choose the wrong sub-technology, you do not receive any ECU.
Example: You found prior to period  t’ that the ideal technology in the field “cellular
telephones” has to be either “tech 2.0” or “tech 3.0”. Suppose “tech 2.0” is the ideal
technology. Then you receive one ECU for choosing “tech 2.0” after period t’. For your choice
“tech 3.0”, or “tech 3.1”, or ... “tech 3.6”, you definitely do not receive any ECU. We assume
that “tech 2.6” is the ideal sub-technology. Then you receive two ECU for choosing “tech
2.6”, while you do not earn any ECU for choosing “tech 2.1”, or “tech 2.2”, or ... “tech 2.5”.
If, for any technology field, you (or the other participant) are the first to find the ideal
sub-technology, you obtain a patent for the next three periods in this technology field (and
the other participant is not allowed to choose the ideal sub-technology for that time). Such a
patent on the ideal sub-technology devalues any patent that may exist on the ideal
technology, so that the patent on the ideal technology ends immediately. Please note that
you have to pay one ECU for trying a new sub-technology.
After each period t you are informed about your own earnings (Dt) and your choice in
period t. Further, you learn about the earnings and choices of the other participant in period t.
Finally, all current patents and your accumulated earnings from all the periods so far are
indicated to you. Your total profit in the experiment is determined by the sum of the received
ECU from all periods of the experiment (D = D1 + D2 + ... + D15) minus the sum of all incurred23
costs for trying new technologies and sub-technologies (denoted as K). You start with an
endowment of 30 ECU, so that your earnings at the end of the experiment will amount to 30
+ D - K ECU. All ECU that you earned in the experiment will be exchanged at the rate of 1
ECU = 0.1 euro and will be paid to you in cash. Note that there is the possibility to go
bankrupt in this experiment if you unsuccessfully spend your entire endowment on
exploration without finding any ideal (sub-)technology. In this case, you will not receive any
profit for the 15 periods.
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you to correctly answer a number of questions that
aim at improving your understanding of the experiment. Please fill in that questionnaire
thoroughly. Once you have finished, an experimenter will come to your place and verify your
answers.
Appendix: Figures
Figure 1: Mean accumulated capital of leaders and followers24
Figure 2: Boxplot of investments in product improvements25
Figure 3: Total investments in second generation product improvementsJenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
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